历史的弧线：奥巴马外交政策评说（1）

导读：在奥巴马就任第44任总统之时，他已经有了一个雄心勃勃的外交政策构想。按照他本人的说法，他寻求将历史之弧弯向更正义、更自由与更和平的方向。本系列文章内容摘译自布鲁金斯学会2012年2月出版的《扭转历史——奥巴马的外交政策》（Bending History: Barack Obama\'s Foreign Policy）一书，该书由马丁·因迪克（Martin S. Indyk）、李侃如（Kenneth G. Lieberthal）和迈克尔·奥汉隆（Michael E. O\'Hanlon）三人合著。

历史的弧线很长

迄今为止，巴拉克 奥巴马所实行的外交政策与其说是富有远见，倒不如说务实更为妥当。虽然说它充分地显示出在大多数问题上能够有力地维护美国的国家利益，但除了成功地铲除奥萨马 本 拉登以外，却鲜有什么特殊建树，有望垂名青史。按理说成功地维护了国家安全，还避免了一场更严重的经济危机，是相当了不起的成就。但这些成绩是以相对的负面信息——即那些本可能发生但却避免了的事情——为坐标来衡量的，如恐怖主义袭击，或第二轮经济危机。此外，这些成绩也远没有达到奥巴马自己所设定的宏伟目标，实现他在上任之初时所憧憬的外交上的历史性突破。

对未来的外交路线，也很难从奥巴马的外交政策中找到清晰的脉络，看不出他将采取什么全面策略来扩大美国的利益或扭转历史。由于他是竞选连任，所以十分关键的是，他打算在第二任期内要做的事情究竟与他第一次竞选时向全国和全世界展示的竞选计划有什么不同。2007和2008年奥巴马激起了人们极大的梦想和期待，但同样的情况在2012年不会再出现了。

充满宏图大志的演讲，人们已经听过了；再二再三地重复，不可能再引起同样的轰动。特别是，鼓舞人心的言词与他在许多实际问题的处理过程中是脱节的。实际上，不管那些演讲经过怎样的精心雕琢，它们已在某种程度上成为这位总统的负累。因为他所施行的外交政策与他所承诺的宏伟目标之间有着明显的差距，这使得国内外都产生了一些讥讽和失望之声音。之所以会这样，是因为当他身居总统高位，他就必须以不同的角度面对各种世界问题。况且，有不少总统都是竞选时是一套，执政时是另一套。不过，因为他比通常那些总统候选人能更广泛地激起人们的希望和期待。所以，他所设定的目标和他所取得的成就之间的差距就显得尤为重要。

这种情况是可以补救的，至少部分如此。在总统本人看来，对于他最关键的是：美国将按照正在形成的、符合经济实际的世界新格局中美国所处的位置逐渐调整它的领导地位。这一点，他应该作为自己再次当选的治国方略提出来，我们提出的建议亦适用于来自共和党的总统。（高菲 译）

THE ARC OF HISTORY IS LONG

Barack Obama’s foreign policy to date has been more pragmatic than visionary. It has displayed eminently competent stewardship of the nation’s interests on most issues, though lacking—with the notable exception of the elimination of Osama bin Laden—in signature accomplishments that might create a distinctive historical legacy. Keeping the country safe and helping prevent an even worse economic meltdown are considerable feats. But they are measured mostly against negative counterfacts—bad things that could have happened but were prevented, such as another big terror strike or another great depression. They are also less momentous achievements than Obama set for himself, and are not the kind of historic breakthroughs that he might have envisioned for his foreign policy at the outset of his administration.

The record also leaves no clear Obama road map for the future, no particularly compelling overall strategy for how he would advance American interests, or bend history. As he prepares to run for reelection, the difference between the agenda that he presented the nation and the world in his first campaign and what he will likely to do in his second is significant. Obama evoked very big dreams in 2007 and 2008 in a way that he will not be able to do in 2012.

The visionary speeches have already been given and cannot make news the second or third time around the way they did initially. That is especially true because they would not be clearly connected to how he has governed on most issues. Indeed, however well crafted, those speeches have become somewhat of a liability for this president. The gaps between his grand visions and how he actually conducts foreign policy have become clear, breeding some degree of cynicism and disappointment among his audiences at home and abroad. This is the result of his practical need to confront the world’s problems as he found them once in office, and he is not unusual among presidents in governing differently than he campaigned. Nonetheless, he conjured up hopes and expectations in more sweeping ways than the typical presidential candidate. As such, the distance between his original goals and his actual accomplishments has become quite considerable.

The situation can be remedied, at least partially. The president’s own views of what matters most to him—a gradual readjustment of America’s leadership role in an emerging global order that fits the straightened economic circumstances in which the United States finds itself—suggest the direction that he should propose taking the country if reelected. Much of the advice we offer would apply equally well to a Republic president.